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reTurNS To ForeiGN laNGuaGeS oF NaTiVe WorKerS iN THe europeaN uNioN
ViCTor a. GiNSburGH aND JuaN prieTo-roDriGueZ* most of the literature on returns to languages is concerned with immigrants. The authors' study, which uses the european Community Household panel Survey for the period 1994-2001, infers returns to non-native languages by native workers in nine countries of the european union. The study differs from other studies that deal with the same issue in three respects. First, instead of using a dummy for each language, they use the ratio of the population not proficient in a given country's national language and compare the results with the more traditional approach using dummies. Second, they correct for time-independent measurement errors in self-reporting and find that the resulting iV estimates are much larger than those obtained by olS. They also suggest that there is little room for time-persistent errors and heterogeneity and that therefore their estimates should suffer ostensibly little from unobserved ability biases. Finally, they estimate iV quantile regressions to illustrate how returns to languages vary at different points of the distribution of earnings.
A lthough english has become the lingua franca (just as latin, and later French, was in earlier times) and is understood by 1.5 to 1.8 billion citizens (Crystal 2001) , countries whose official languages are not english represent a large share of the world's GDp. Their inhabitants may substantially improve their human capital, however, if they know languages other than their own mother tongue (or english). presumably, the more international a country's official language is, the less economically advantageous it is for its inhabitants to learn other languages. alternatively, citizens of countries whose native tongues are spoken by smaller populations (say, Denmark) have an incentive to learn foreign languages. obviously, not all languages will be equally rewarded by the labor market due to both supply and demand factors.
Though languages are important in the context of international transactions, the domestic relevance of language skills-for example, the importance for immigrants to know the language spoken in the country to which they move-is the topic of much research. 1 only some of the literature considers the case of natives in multilingual societies, such as Canada (Shapiro and Stelcner 1997) , Hungary (Galasi 2003) , luxemburg (Klein 2003) , Switzerland (Cattaneo and Winkelman 2005) , and the united States (Fry and lowell 2003) . Countries of the european union before its last expansion to the east are the subject of a paper by Williams (2006) .
in this paper, we estimate returns to languages in nine european countries in 2001, a more recent year of the same panel survey as the one used by Williams. We also differ in three other respects from Williams. First, instead of representing proficiency in languages by dummy variables (or by the level of efficiency), we use an indicator that links to the "usefulness" of the language. in other words, the indicator reflects the frequency with which it is not spoken in a given country-that is, the share of the population that ignores the language (the disenfranchisement rate, or supply scarcity of the language). For individuals who only use the language of the country (French in France, for example), this share is zero (or close to 0 if the country hosts immigrants who do not speak the official language); for a language that nobody knows but is useful at the workplace, it will be equal to 1. The parameter associated with the variable allows retrieving returns to languages for which one knows the disenfranchisement rate and as long as the estimated parameter is positive, the implied returns may turn out to be larger for languages that are less common. We also include results for other specifications of language proficiency, such as english used at work, or foreign language knowledge, whether used at work or not. Second, we try to take into account the endogeneity issue between usage of foreign languages at the job and earnings, and we correct for time-independent measurement errors in self-reported variables. Third, using Chernozhukov and Hansen's (2004 , 2005 ) iV quantile regression estimator, we also estimate iV quantile regressions, which illustrate how returns to languages vary at different points of the distribution of earnings. This technique allows us to control for workers' heterogeneity even if occupation is not controlled for, since unobserved characteristics will tend to be more similar around a specific wage quantile and, thus, occupational differences will tend to be small.
Data, the Model, and econometric Issues Data
We use the european Community Household panel (eCHp), which contains information on panels of individuals in 15 european countries from 1994 to 2001. This information is homogenous across countries since the surveys were coordinated by euroSTaT, although the sample sizes vary across countries and years. The surveys describe the socio-economic characteristics of individuals older than 16, grouped by households. They include personal characteristics, family structure, current employment, education and training, labor status, wages, family income from sources other than wages and salaries, region of residence, and languages used at the workplace.
between 1994 and 1999, questions about language skills concerned first, second, and third foreign languages used at the workplace. These questions were dropped in belgium, Germany, luxemburg, and the united Kingdom between 1997 and 1999. Sweden joined the survey in 1997 but its questionnaire did not include the questions on languages. in 2000 and 2001, questions were formulated somewhat differently and were moved to another part of the questionnaire. Workers were asked to report on the main and second languages used "at their main job." 2 We were thus faced with the following issues and possibilities: (a) we found it inappropriate to merge both parts of the panel, that is, 1994-1999 and 2000-2001 , since the essential questions on languages changed after 2000; (b) we could have used panel techniques on the 1994-1999 waves, omitting belgium, Germany, luxemburg, and the united Kingdom for which only three years were available; (c) the waves 2000-2001 are more recent, and the information is consistent. We could have run panel techniques using these two years, but we preferred instead to use the information contained in the 2000 survey to control for non-persistent time components of the error term. 3 Though both parts of the panel include 15 countries, the questions on languages failed to be included for Sweden, the united Kingdom, and the Netherlands in 2001. We omitted luxemburg and belgium, given their multilingual situation. We also dropped ireland since the survey contains a very small number of respondents (less than 2%) who need to speak a foreign language at their workplace. 4 We are thus left with nine countries: austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, italy, portugal, and Spain.
We included only natives, even if they are not citizens of the country in which they were born. Since most of them should have attended the national schooling system (which may include international schools), we assume that they know the official language of the country. in order to decrease heterogeneity, and since we were not interested in gender comparisons, we excluded women. Table 1 contains information on the number of observations in each country, as well as the number of individuals who report needing one or several among the main european languages, that is, english, French, German, italian, and Spanish, as well as the official language of the country.
specification of the Returns to Languages equation
our objective is to estimate the effect of language knowledge (and used at the workplace) on earnings. The standard (languageaugmented) mincer-type equation can be specified as
for individuals i 5 1, 2, . . ., N, where the vector β and the scalar γ are parameters; w i represents the wage rate; x i is a vector of exogenous variables and u i is a random error. in the case of immigrants, D i is usually a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if individual i reports being proficient in the language of the country for which the equation is estimated, and 0 otherwise. There are two important differences between this model and our alternative specifications. First, we do not deal with immigrants but with native workers and thus try to estimate their returns to non-national languages. Second, we use three different specifications for D i , two of which are concerned with the language(s) used at the main workplace. Therefore, when an individual mentions a language, it measures not only his knowledge (the supply side), but also what the firm needs, that is, the demand side, so we deal with the matching of workers to jobs. it may happen that a language with a high disenfranchisement rate is also one for which there are few opportunities to find a job where this language is demanded, but if the individual finds a matching firm, his reward may nevertheless be important. This will have an influence on the estimation procedure since our definition of the language variable is not a pure human capital variable and may be less affected by the ability bias studied by Griliches (1977) .
econometric Issues
unobserved heterogeneity affects our attempt to estimate the returns to languages just as it does in the returns to education literature. Specifically, when researchers try to assess the effect of education on earnings, both education and earnings may depend on unobservable individual skills and talent. explanatory variables, in particular D i , will be correlated with the error term in equation (1). This produces a positive bias on the olS estimates, if D i is positively correlated with unobserved ability. The solution pursued in the literature on private returns to education is to use instruments for education (such as time of admission-see angrist and Krueger 1991), or to rely on natural experiments (such as educational outcomes and earnings of identical twins-see ashenfelter and Krueger 1994). This issue is pervasive in the returns to language equation and thus needs iV estimation. a second issue is related to misclassified language indicators (see Dustmann and Van Soest 2001 and . 5 in panel (or crosssection) data, language ability is usually selfreported. This is certainly the case when individuals report on their level of language proficiency using an ordinal scale, but it also occurs when their answer is dichotomous (yes or no). Two types of errors affect these variables: (1) a purely random error, which is independent over time; and (2) an error that is time-persistent, since an individual may have the same tendency to over-or under-report. 6 To make the issue clear, we follow Dustmann and Van Soest (2002) , and rewrite equation (1) 
where η it represents a time-independent unsystematic error and ξ i represents a timepersistent error. Substitution of equation (3) in equation (2) leads to equation (4) and clarifies the possible correlations between the error term and the language variable:
estimating equation (4) by olS yields biased results of γ if the error term [(α i 2 γ ξ i ) 1 (ν it 2 γ η it )] is correlated with D it . This can be due to measurement errors (in which case η it and ξ i are correlated with D it ) or to the correlation between the unobserved individual-specific α i and D it .
To deal with the time-independent measurement error, Dustmann and Van Soest (2002) suggested instrumenting self-reported current language fluency by leads and lags of fluency.
They noted, however, that this does not eliminate time-persistent errors, which introduce heterogeneity and can be taken care of by introducing additional control variables (household characteristics, such as partner variables, if one believes that mating is assortative). in order to remove all types of correlations simultaneously, they suggested instrumenting by the education level of parents. The results they obtained show that the downward bias due to time-varying misclassification errors is much larger than the one due to the usual type of unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, we expect estimations of returns to languages to become larger when correcting for this kind of bias using lagged instruments. They also found that the bias due to time-persistent errors is quite small. This would imply that endogeneity problems generated by the first component of the error term in equation (4) could be considered negligible.
specification Used in this Paper
in the equations that we estimate, we wanted to keep the specification as close as possible to the mincerian model used in the literature on returns to education. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the wage rate. The vector x i contains the following control variables: two dummy variables that represent higher (university) and secondary education, respectively; the number of years of job tenure and its square; 7 and the number of years of potential experience and its square. in order to control for occupation, we also estimated models using occupation dummies based on the international Standard Classification of occupations (iSCo-88) at the one-digit level. one must be careful with the interpretation of such results, however, because they raise an important issue about causality. if knowing english is a prerequisite to securing a job in international finance, high wage rates associated with this field will be observed, but they will be due to language ability since workers with the same qualification but without the prerequisite knowledge of english will be working in other sectors. in this case, controlling for occupation will underestimate the real value of language usage at work. This leads us to complement our empirical analysis with Chernozhukov and Hansen's (2004 , 2005 iV quantile estimator, a completely different estimation strategy to control as much as possible for unobserved characteristics at work, without using occupation dummies. language effects are represented by a unique scalar variable, D i , primarily because we use instrumental variables to control for endogeneity. Dealing with several endogenous variables may lead to inefficient estimation, especially when some of the dummy variables are, on average, close to zero (only a small percentage of workers speak italian, for example).
To check whether our results are robust, we consider three different specifications in order to capture the effect of languages (that is the D i variable) on wages.
Model 1
Since english is the foreign language that is used most often in each country, we use a dummy, which takes the value 1 if english is required at work, and 0 otherwise.
Model 2
in some countries, languages other than english are also needed. This is so for French in italy, portugal, and Spain; German in Denmark, France, and italy; or Spanish in France and portugal. We use countrywide disenfranchisement rates (see Ginsburgh and Weber 2005) or supply scarcity of the language that individual i reports to be using at his workplace. Then, D i represents the percentage of the overall population not proficient in each foreign language and is based on the results of a survey commissioned in 2000 by the Directorate of education and Culture of the european union (eu). 8 8 in each of the e.u. 15 countries, 1,000 interviews were conducted on language proficiency. The information used by Ginsburgh and Weber (2005) to compute disenfranchisement rates takes into account answers to the following two questions: "(a) What is your mother tongue? (note to the interviewer: do not probe; do not read [the list of languages] out; if bilingual, state both languages); (b) What other languages do you know? (show card [containing a list of languages]; read out; multiple answers possible)." There were four possible choices for (b), and the assumption made by Ginsburgh and Weber is that the first two choices that came to the D it is thus a variable whose value is zero for an individual who uses no foreign language at his workplace (the disenfranchisement rate for the domestic language is zero) or the value taken by the disenfranchisement rate of the foreign language that he does use. if he reports using several languages, the variable takes the value for the language for which disenfranchisement is the largest. We only account for the five most widely internationally spoken languages in the e.u. before the 2004 enlargement (english, French, German, italian, and Spanish). The scalar nature of D it will also be useful in our quantile iV estimation procedure. Disenfranchisement rates for the five languages studied are presented in Table 2 . models 1 and 2 use a definition of D it based on workplace language requirements. DiNardo and pischke (1997: 300) pointed out that inferences based on "usage at work" of some tools (computers, pencils, telephone) can be misleading if one tries to measure their effect on wages. at the same time, they recognized that this problem arises because "computers are only productive in conjunction with a specific set of skills." This is less so in our case since we do not use a proxy for skills but rather the skill itself. Still, to avoid the possible bias described by DiNardo and pischke, we also use an alternative definition of our variable in model 3.
Model 3
This model concerns foreign language knowledge in general. Here, D it is a dummy variable equal to one when both conditions-"a second language is handled well enough to converse in most social contexts" and "a second language is handled well enough to read complex information"-are met, and zero otherwise. one issue arises insofar as the eCHp survey gives no details about which languages people know mind of the individual interviewed were the languages that he knew best. There were also questions on whether the knowledge of each tongue mentioned was "very good," "good," or "basic," but the answers were not taken into account. See iNra (2001). unless they are needed at work, and no information at all is available for Germany. moreover, this is a genuine self-assessed measure of language ability, which seems to lead to serious biases. Finnie and meng (2005: 1944) , for example, showed that "tested literacy performs much better than self-assessed literacy and using a self-assessed measure is likely to lead to very significant underestimates of the effects of literacy on employment." our choice of language used at work (models 1 and 2) is therefore much more likely to avoid this bias.
in all three models, the expected sign of γ in equation (2) is positive. For model 2, this implies that the higher the disenfranchisement rate, the higher the expected return to the language. This formulation is advantageous in that all foreign languages are subsumed by a unique variable whereas in every country the effect of each language can easily be retrieved by multiplying γ by the disenfranchisement rate of the language.
To deal with time-varying errors, we follow Dustmann and Van Soest (2002) and instrument D it by its lagged (2000) value. Since in models 1 and 2 D it represents a language used at the workplace and not self-reported linguistic abilities, there is little room for time-persistent measurement errors. in principle at least, the reported answer can be considered objective. language used at work can vary over time for several reasons: (a) changes within the firm (the firm begins exporting to some new markets or stops doing so between t-1 and t); (b) an individual surveyed in 2000 has moved to another firm, at which language requirements are different; (c) self-reporting errors. Table 3 provides an overview of the changes in reported languages used at the workplace between the two surveys. Details are available for all five languages in each country, but we only report the total number of switches. as is evident, differences may be quite significant, accounting for as much as 24.3 and 18.0% in Denmark and Finland, respectively.
in models 1 and 2, D it also measures a demand-side requirement by the firm that hires the worker. Then, although job matches are not random and lead to some correlation between supply-side and demand-side random terms, the correlation between D it and the error term will be weaker than if we were to use a human capital variable. Hence, the bias due to unobserved ability of the individual can be assumed to be less important here. Therefore, we can probably ignore the timepersistent individual effect, α i , which appears in equation (2), at least in models 1 and 2.
We also tried to use partner's education as an instrument to control for this kind of endogeneity, which reduces the sample size since we lose workers who have no partner. moreover, when we use only partner's education as an instrument, anderson's canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test and the Cragg-Donald chi-squared test statistic show that the model is under-identified for all countries, with the exception of austria and Spain. When including both lagged disenfranchisement rate and partner's education, the model is over-identified in all cases and, following Hall and peixe (2003) , partner's education is a redundant instrument since asymptotic efficiency is not improved when using it. The survey contains no other variables that could be useful as instruments to correct for unobserved heterogeneity. Dustmann and Van Soest's (2002) findings indicate, however, that correcting for misclassification already produces meaningful results. as we indicate above, there is ostensibly no reason to expect this type of heterogeneity in our case. We offer additional insights on this issue in the appendix, in which we discuss estimation results controlling for unobserved ability. our results confirm that unobserved heterogeneity does not seem to be an issue.
estimation Results
Table 4 displays returns to language estimates using equation (4) for models 1-3, with and without occupation controls. To make the coefficients of model 2 (where D it represents disenfranchisement rates) comparable to those of the two other models (where D it is a dummy for english or for foreign language proficiency in general-essentially 
Notes:
The following independent variables were also included in all the models: two dummy variables that represent higher (university) and secondary education, respectively; the number of years of job tenure and its square; the number of years of potential experience and its square. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
english), its coefficients are transformed into returns to english. 9 results point to the following observations. First, coefficients are generally significantly different from zero at the .01 level. only Denmark and austria present returns that in some cases are not significantly different from zero. Second, as expected, returns are smaller when occupation controls are introduced. Controlling for occupation may underestimate the true returns though these remain generally larger than 15% (with the exception of austria and Denmark), and differences between the coefficients in the two formulations are sizeable in less than half of the countries analyzed (austria, Germany, Spain, and portugal), regardless the specification of the language variable. Third, all three models lead to very similar orders of magnitude for returns.
We prefer model 2, without controlling for occupations. The specification allows including all five languages and, at the same time, controlling for endogeneity, which is not the case for model 1. The model also takes into account requirements of the firm in which the worker is employed. Table 5 contains detailed results for equation (4), where D it represents disenfranchisement rates and is instrumented by the lagged value D i,t-1 . The lower part of the table presents the regression coefficient of D it on D i,t-1 (and other exogenous variables) in the regression in which D it is instrumented (first stage of iV estimations). The r 2 illustrate that, except for Germany, in which the number of switches between t-1 and t is the smallest (see Table 3 ), the differences in reporting language use between the two waves of the survey are quite important.
The parameter of interest, after instrumentation, is positive in all nine countries and is estimated with small standard errors, with the exception of Denmark, in which it is significantly different from zero at the .07 probability level only. Some heterogeneity between countries is observed with the largest values obtained for Finland, France, 9 They are multiplied by the rate of disenfranchisement for english in each country, as are the standard errors.
Germany, portugal, and Spain, and the lowest for Denmark.
The number of other variables is purposefully small, in order to remain close to a mincer-type specification. in fact, usual control variables, such as occupation or firm size, may be (positively) correlated with D i and their inclusion could lead to an underestimation of foreign language returns. both higher and secondary education have positive effects that are all significantly different from zero at conventional probability levels, but the effect of secondary education is smaller. Years of tenure have a positive influence. The relation is linear in most countries, since the squared term is only significant in Denmark, France, and portugal. potential experience (number of years after last degree) also has, as expected, a positive impact, but returns are decreasing (the squared term is negative and significant in all countries). Table 6 compares olS and iV results for model 2. as is the case in other papers (bleakley and Chin 2004; Galassi 2003; and Dustmann and Van Soest 2001, 2002) , iV estimation leads to much larger returns than olS. in the presence of measurement errors, one can expect olS to generate a downward bias. at the same time, olS produces an upward bias in the presence of the ability bias. our results can be considered additional evidence for the larger importance of misclassification errors.
The linearity assumption made for the disenfranchisement variable may be too strong since it implies that the larger the disenfranchisement rate is in a given country, the larger the (logged) return will be. Therefore, we also estimated equations including linear and squared instrumented disenfranchisement rates; results are shown in Table 7 . The coefficients of the quadratic (and the linear) terms are significantly different from zero only for North european countries (austria, Denmark, Finland, and Germany). returns may end up decreasing with disenfranchisement after some threshold, though it should be noted that this non-linearity is driven by a very small number of observations (See Table 1 ). in Southern european countries (France, Greece, italy, portugal, and Spain), the quadratic terms are not Notes: The dependent variable is the (logged) wage rate. iV standard errors are in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
significantly different from zero at any usual probability level. The two groups of countries thus differ in their behavior. in Northern europe, english is used at the workplace by some 20 to 50% of individuals and benefits from larger (log) returns than other languages with higher rates of disenfranchisement, but it is also less often used at the workplace. Figure 1 , in which the relation between (log) returns and disenfranchisement rates is represented for each country, shows that the returns for english are almost identical in the linear and the quadratic case. english can thus be considered the dominant lingua franca used in Northern europe, with little competition from other languages.
The Danish case is worth noting. German is rather common in Denmark, where it is used in 10% of the cases, but its returns are much lower than those of english. This may be due to the fact that almost 40% of the Danish population knows German whereas only 10% of those who speak German seem to be needed by firms, thus driving the return to German to almost zero. a similar, though weaker force is at work for english, which is known by 75% of the Danish population and is used by some 50% of the firms. This results in a positive return to english that is lower than in the three other Northern countries.
in Southern europe, the relation between returns to languages and disenfranchisement can be considered linear, so that languages for which the rate of disenfranchisement is larger than the one for english may also get higher rewards. and this is indeed the case for German in France, French in Greece, French and German in italy, French and Spanish in portugal, and French in Spain. Four countries in this list (France, italy, portugal, and Spain) share romance languages. Though english is also the mostused language by firms, any other romance language, especially French, is an alternative to english. There are no alternatives to english in Northern europe. This dichotomy between the two parts of europe is consistent with melitz's (2008) empirical conclusion that english is not more effective than other european languages in promoting trade.
Greece is also a special case since Greek is not a romance language. Greeks therefore may be indifferent regarding the choice of bearing the cost of learning any romance or Germanic language, but the expected benefit of english is higher. That is why the use of english by firms dominates. Table 8 shows disenfranchisement coefficients, which are transformed into returns to languages for the five most widely used languages in europe. Since the dependent variable (wage rate) is defined in logarithms, the parameters can be interpreted as reflecting the percentage increase of the wage rate. returns will be large if either the estimated country parameter or the disenfranchisement rate for the language is large in the specific country, since returns are obtained as the product of the parameter and the disenfranchisement rate. returns to languages are obtained using the linear functional form for France, Greece, italy, portugal, and Notes: The dependent variable is the (logged) wage rate. iV standard errors are in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level.
Figure 1. relation between (log) returns and Disenfranchisement
Notes: returns for languages are obtained using the linear functional form for France, Greece, italy, portugal, and Spain and the quadratic form for austria, Denmark, Finland, and Germany. For these countries, linear returns are also displayed. returns for languages for which the number of speakers is smaller than 1% of the country's sample are not displayed. Spain (see Table 5 ), and the quadratic form for austria, Denmark, Finland, and Germany (Table 7) . our specification allows estimating potential returns (insofar as a firm needs an individual who knows the language), but for clarity's sake, returns to languages for which the number of speakers is smaller than 1% of the country's sample are not displayed.
The research closest to ours is Williams (2006) , who used data from the european Community Household panel Survey (eCHp) between 1994 and 1999. The information he obtained resulted from answers to the following question included in the surveys: "Does your work involve the use of a language other than (the official language of the country)?" Williams ran olS mincertype regressions without controlling for endogeneity and his explanatory variables included a large number of socio-economic indicators. To capture the effect of language knowledge, a dummy was introduced for each of the following languages if they were cited as the first foreign language used at the workplace: english, French, German, Spanish, italian, and "all other." in an alternative specification, all languages were pooled and only one coefficient was estimated. equations were run for each of the e.u. 15 member states separately (with the exception of Sweden) in 1996. The results indicated that in austria, Finland, italy, Spain, and the Netherlands, english was the only language that yielded a significant return. Substantial returns were also found, however, for French in Denmark, luxemburg, Greece, and portugal, whereas German generated positive and significant returns in belgium, luxemburg, and France. Spanish generated positive returns in France, italian did so in luxemburg, and portuguese and Dutch did so in belgium. in the united Kingdom, no second language was rewarded. in sum, languages add between 5 and 20% to earnings, depending on the country and the language considered.
Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression Results
in the previous section, we showed that the relation between returns and disenfranchisement may be complex. and indeed we found that it is quadratic in some countries. Here, we look at another dimension of this complex relationship, the wage distribution. indeed, the results of the previous section give the returns to languages only at the mean of the distribution. it may also be instructive to know how language returns vary at different points of the conditional distribution of log wages. Quantile regression can be understood as "completing the regression picture" (Koenker and Hallock 2001: 154) . as mosteller and Tukey (1977: 266) explained, the usual regression model gives "a grand summary for the averages of the distribution corresponding to the set of [righthand side variables]. We could go further and compute several different regression curves corresponding to the various percentage points of the distributions and thus get a more complete picture of the set." This is what quantile regression does in a more 
Notes: returns for languages are obtained using the linear functional form for France, Greece, italy, portugal, and Spain (see Table 5 ), and the quadratic form for austria, Denmark, Finland, and Germany (Table 7) . See also text. returns for languages for which the number of users at the workplace is smaller than 1% of the country's sample are not displayed.
sophisticated way than estimating a regression for each quantile. 10 Since workers in the same quantile of the conditional wage distribution can be expected to have similar unobserved characteristics (in particular, occupation), quantile regression may help to control for unobserved heterogeneity without overcontrolling for occupation. increasing returns along quantiles could be a signal of a positive correlation between languages and unobserved heterogeneity. although standard quantile regression could limit this endogeneity problem, it is not clear that it will completely remove it. recent research by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004 , 2005 has extended the quantile regression approach to deal explicitly with endogeneity. They proposed an iV quantile estimator that is naturally robust to weak identification and that we use here, with the same specification and instruments as in the regressions presented above. The results of the calculations for the same nine european countries (and using a specification comparable to that of model 2) are presented in graphical form for 19 quantiles (0.05, 0.10, . . . , 0.90, 0.95) in Figure 2 . The shaded regions represent the 95% confidence intervals around the iV quantile regression estimates of the effect of disenfranchisement on wages (plain curves). The horizontal discontinuous lines represent the iV mean coefficients discussed in the previous section and the dotted straight lines delimit its 95% confidence interval. The effects of foreign language proficiency on earnings of both estimation methods are consistent and lead to results that are very similar. recall that the estimates can be interpreted as the percentage increase of wages for individuals who know a language other than the domestic one and use it at their workplace (they still have to be converted using the disenfranchisement rate of the language in a specific country).
The results of this technique show that there is a significant degree of heterogeneity 10 See buchinsky (1998) and Koenker and Hallock (2001) for introductions to quantile regression. within countries, suggesting that standard olS or iV estimations do not capture what is going on in all the quantiles with the exception of France and Germany, in which the iV quantile regression estimates are not significantly different from the iV since the quantile estimations always lie within of the iV confidence intervals. For other countries, this can be understood as a signal that there is extra information from using iV quantile regression techniques. The effects are larger in the upper deciles of the wage distribution for half of the countries studied (austria, Denmark, italy, portugal, and Spain). This is not very surprising since foreign languages are more useful for white-collar workers whose incomes are likely to be in the upper part of the wage distribution. both martins and pereira (2004) and Chiswick and miller (2007) , who also used quantile regression, pointed to the similar stylized fact of returns to education and computer use, respectively, being higher at higher points of the conditional wage distribution. but note that even in those countries where the picture is flatter, the nominal return is larger for higher wages.
The following additional observations can be made. First, in most cases, with the exceptions of Denmark and Greece, which are special cases, the estimated quantile effects are significantly different from zero at almost every quantile, showing that it pays to know (and use) foreign languages. These effects are not, however, significantly different from 0 for the lowest quantiles in portugal and Spain. Second, in Finland, France, Germany, and Greece, returns are similar for all quantiles. For italy, the effect is stable for all quantiles except the last ones, where it increases. Though language proficiency increases earnings in every point of the conditional distribution of wages, it is only at the very top of this distribution that the need for foreign languages gains in importance and is rewarded accordingly.
conclusions our results show that in all nine countries, foreign language proficiency used at the workplace has a positive effect on earnings. The returns to languages that we isolate are much larger than those found in most studies on immigrants who acquire the language of the country to which they move. This finding is not unexpected since there is less market pressure to pay higher wages to immigrants who learn and speak the national language, compared to what nationals earn. Together with two other measures of language proficiency, we use a market-related measure-the disenfranchisement rate of a language in every country. This makes it possible to "predict" returns for languages that are spoken by a small number of individuals, and for which returns can hardly be estimated directly, because the number of observations is too small.
The parameter of interest (returns to languages) is affected by a substantial downward bias if estimated by ordinary least squares, which take no account of time-varying measurement errors. This suggests that the bias related to measurement errors can be more important than the ability bias. Dustmann and Van Soest (2001), bleakley and Chin (2004) , and Galasi (2003) observed comparable outcomes. The results that we report show that mean returns can be quite large and that there is heterogeneity between countries.
The iV regression results indicate that two groups of countries can be considered. in Northern europe, the relation between returns and disenfranchisement is not linear, implying that english provides larger returns than other languages with higher rates of disenfranchisement, but that they are less used at the workplace. english can thus be considered as the dominant lingua franca, with little competition from other languages. Denmark is an interesting case. Given that many Danes are fluent in both english and German, returns to the two languages are lower than in the three other Northern european countries. more language education may thus eventually crowd out private returns.
in Southern european countries, the relation between returns to languages and disenfranchisement is linear, so that languages other than english for which the rate of disenfranchisement is larger may also be better rewarded. Though english is also the mostused language by firms, any other romance language, especially French, is an alternative to english. Greece is also a special case since Greek is not a romance language, and the use of english by firms is dominant.
results are heterogeneous across countries. This is also the result of quantile regressions. in half of the countries analyzed, the effects are larger in the upper deciles of the wage distribution, since this is where foreign languages are most useful. Note that even in countries in which the picture is flatter, the nominal return is larger for higher wages. This effect may, however, be a consequence of the fact that we do not control enough for unobserved ability when using olS or iV estimators.
The survey includes questions on the improvement of language capacities from one year to the next. individuals may chose between a level of improvement that renders their proficiency good (that is, enabling them to "read complex information" and to "converse in most social contexts") or poor to medium (enabling them to "read basic information" and to "converse in routine situations"). one may assume that individuals who have improved their language skills have constant unobserved ability and that the average unobserved ability is similar regardless of whether they have been able to use their new skills at the job.
We selected the reduced sample of those individuals who declared improvements in their foreign language skills between 2000 and 2001, assuming that timepersistent unobserved ability is constant. Clearly, the number of observations is much smaller, and we had to pool observations over countries (the same countries as before, with the exception of Germany, for which there is no information on language proficiency). This sample will not suffer from ability bias, however. indeed, this bias arises if the sample contains individuals with different levels of unobserved ability that is correlated with some of the independent variables. obviously, it is possible that individuals who are able to learn foreign languages have a higher average unobserved ability than others. by selecting those who have improved their languages skills in the last year, we can confidently 1.664*** (0.035) continued reduce differences in unobserved ability, especially the one related to languages skills. We used the same model as the country-by-country estimation with one exception: because countries are pooled, country-specific effects are included. in appendix Table a, we present the results for three equations. The first two are run on those individuals who declare that they have improved their language proficiency (to the level of either good or poor or medium). The third equation is run on the full sample and is thus prone to the unobserved ability bias. The results show that the parameters of the three equations are not significantly different. We ran a Wald-statistic to test whether the value of the disenfranchisement parameter γ is different from 0.457 (the value of the parameter in equation (c) estimated on the whole sample) in equations (a) and (b) . The values of the statistic are 1.03 and 0.35, respectively, well below any value of a c 2 with one degree of freedom for any standard probability level. Hence, it seems that the ability bias is not significant when using the full sample since the results are not statistically different from those obtained with samples in which unobserved ability is controlled for, or at least strongly reduced. 
